I analyze a cheap talk model in which an informed sender and an uninformed receiver engage in finite-period communication before the receiver chooses a project. During the communication phase, the sender can gradually convey information through multistage cheap talk communication and the receiver can pay money to the sender voluntarily whenever she receives a message. My results show that under some conditions, (i) the receiver can extract more detailed information from the sender than that in the model of one-shot cheap talk communication and (ii) there exists an equilibrium whose outcome Pareto-dominates all the equilibrium outcomes in the model of one-shot cheap talk communication. Moreover, I find an upper bound of the receiver's equilibrium payoff and provide a sufficient condition for it to be approximated by the receiver's payoff under a certain equilibrium. This result shows that multistage information transmission with voluntary monetary transfer can be more beneficial for the receiver than a wide class of other communication protocols (e.g., mediation and arbitration).
Introduction
A lack of information typically leads to inefficient decisions. Therefore, in many economic situations, decision makers need to gather the relevant information before making their decisions. One canonical way of gathering information is consulting informed experts. For example, CEOs consult management consultants; politicians seek advice from strategic planners; and law enforcement officers hire informants. In the abovementioned examples, the individuals who supply information are often paid for doing so.
Contract theory indicates that a properly designed contract containing informationcontingent payments helps the decision maker to screen the information possessed by the informed expert. However, if information is transmitted through ordinary and informal talk, or equivalently, through "cheap talk," contractibility does not always exist. In such situations, the decision maker cannot commit to information-contingent payments. Hence, it seems that allowing the decision maker to make "voluntary" payments does not affect information transmission. Nevertheless, the information transmitted via cheap talk is often bought and sold without signing a contract.
Can voluntary payments by the decision maker facilitate cheap talk communication? If they can, how should the decision maker pay for cheap talk messages? To address this question, I enrich the canonical cheap talk model originally provided by Crawford and Sobel (1982) (hereafter, CS) . Specifically, I analyze a sender-receiver game in which an informed expert (sender or he) and an uninformed decision maker (receiver or she) engage in finite-period communication. During the communication phase, in each period, the sender sends a cheap talk message to the receiver, and then the receiver pays money to the sender voluntarily. Once the communication phase is over, the receiver chooses a project.
In the CS model, the project choice and underlying asymmetric information are one-dimensional. Moreover, the sender's most desirable project is always higher than that of the receiver to a certain degree. Hence, the sender has an incentive to cheat the receiver into choosing a higher project than the receiver's most profitable one. This fact prevents detailed information transmission. By contrast, if the receiver can make message-contingent payments, by paying more money for the messages inducing the lower projects, the receiver can weaken the sender's exaggeration incentive. However, when the information transmission is one shot, the receiver never pays since making payments after receiving a message is a waste of money. In the present study, I consider a scenario in which information is conveyed in a gradual fashion and show that by combining multistage information transmission with the receiver's voluntary payments, a message-contingent payment scheme can be self-enforcing. 1 As a result, information transmission can be improved even in situations in which there is no contractibility.
I find that under some conditions (i) the receiver can obtain more detailed information from the sender than in the CS model 2 and (ii) an equilibrium whose outcome Pareto-dominates all the equilibrium outcomes in the CS model can exist. 3 I also show that no fully separating equilibrium exists in my model. This result implies that information transmission is still limited even in my communication procedure. By considering the well-known uniform-quadratic model, i.e., with quadratic preferences regarding the project and a uniform type distribution, I find an upper bound of the receiver's equilibrium payoff and provide a sufficient condition for it to be approximated by the receiver's payoff under an equilibrium.
To demonstrate the benefit of multistage information transmission with voluntary transfer payments, I construct an interval partition equilibrium in which information about the state of the world is conveyed in order from the right-most interval on the state space. Specifically, in the first period, if the sender sends a message that means that the true state belongs to the right-most interval, the receiver will neither pay money nor obtain additional information in the future. Otherwise, the receiver pays a certain amount of money to the sender. After this payment, in the second period, the sender conveys whether the true state belongs to the second right-most interval that is the neighbor to the left of the first one. If the receiver learns that the true state belongs to the second right-most interval, she will neither pay money nor obtain additional information in the future. Otherwise, the receiver pays money to the sender and then the sender conveys additional information in the next period. This information elicitation is repeated in the communication phase. If the receiver deviates in terms of payment in a period, the sender conveys no information thereafter. Once communication is over, the receiver chooses her best project based on the information she has.
The logic underlying this equilibrium is as follows. First, under the information elicitation explained above, the receiver pays money to the sender whenever the information opposite to the sender's bias is conveyed. As a result, the receiver makes message-contingent payments on the equilibrium path: a higher payment for information inducing a lower project. As noted earlier, this payment scheme weakens the sender's exaggeration incentive. Second, since the sender can gradually convey his information, he can punish the receiver for not paying by babbling. Thus, the receiver makes a payment in the current period to prevent the sender's babbling in the future. Roughly speaking, similar to Benoit and Krishna (1985) , the dependence of the selection of the future equilibrium on players' past behavior constructs punishments for their deviation. This fact enables the receiver to make message-contingent payments 2 This result means that there exists an equilibrium whose partition has a greater number of elements than that achieved in any equilibrium in the CS model. 3 In my model, there always exists an equilibrium in which the receiver never pays money to the sender. For instance, irrespective of the number of periods in the communication phase, there exists an equilibrium in which the sender sends an informative message to the receiver only in the first period and the receiver never pays. The equilibrium partition achieved in such an equilibrium is achievable in the CS model. Obviously, players waste time on pointless communication; in other words, the receiver does not use long-term communication effectively. Therefore, by constructing equilibria inducing Pareto improvements, I show the benefit of multistage information transmission.
to some extent during the communication phase.
The model I describe is potentially applicable for studying the effective use of informants. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) mentions that the "use of informants to assist in the investigation of criminal activity may involve an element of deception, ... or cooperation with persons whose reliability and motivation may be open to question." 4 This statement suggests that informants are often biased and that their information might neither be credible nor certifiable. Alemany (2002) indicates that cooperation agreements between the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) and informants are often silent with respect to the compensation of the latter. This fact implies that the parties may not always be able to sign a contract containing information-contingent payments. Indeed, there are numerous cases of oral promises made by DEA agents to informants subsequently being broken. 5 The present study shows that by using multistage information elicitation and voluntary transfer payments, information transmission can be improved even in situations in which there is no contractibility.
My results have important implications for the theory of organizational economics regarding designing communication protocols and organizational structures. I show that multistage information transmission with voluntary transfer payments can be more beneficial for the receiver than a wide range of other communication protocols. It is well known that information transmission can be improved when more general communication protocols (i.e., noisy communication) are available. 6 By considering a mediation model under the uniform-quadratic assumption, 7 Goltsman et al. (2009) characterize the optimal level of noise in the communication. I compare my communication procedure with the optimal mediation that maximizes the receiver's ex ante expected payoff and show that under some conditions, the receiver prefers the former to the latter.
Dessein (2002) studies a simple delegation problem 8 and establishes the remarkable result that the receiver prefers full delegation to communication as long as the incentive conflict is not too large. Since the work of Dessein (2002) , designing "who decides what" has been extensively studied. Many works investigate general settings in which the parties can commit to an information-contingent decision rule. 9 Under the uniform-sender conveys during the face-to-face communication. Therefore, in Krishna and Morgan (2004) , the receiver tries to control the sender's incentive by controlling the degree of uncertainty associated with the outcome of the face-to-face communication. By contrast, in my model, the receiver tries to control the sender's incentive directly through voluntary transfer payments. Spence (1973) shows that costly signaling helps people convey their private information credibly. In the framework of the CS model, Austen-Smith and Banks (2000), Kartik (2007) , and Karamychev and Visser (2016) show that information transmission can be improved when the sender can send a costly message (money burning, or equivalently, paying money to the receiver) to signal information. 13 In their settings, a fully separating equilibrium that is optimal from the receiver's perspective can exist. However, in the equilibrium that maximizes the sender's ex ante expected payoff, the sender does not pay money to separate an interval of states. Karamychev and Visser (2016) show that in the sender's optimal equilibrium, he pays to adjust the pooling intervals. In the present study, I focus on the situation in which the sender cannot pay money (or equivalently, cannot send a costly signal) to the receiver and show that the signaling structure can be endogenously generated by the receiver's voluntary payment. Moreover, Section 4.5 shows that under the uniform-quadratic assumption, the receiver can obtain the higher ex ante expected payoff than that under the sender's optimal equilibrium in the model analyzed in Karamychev and Visser (2016) . This result suggests that in some cases, it might be better for the receiver to generate the signaling structure by herself through voluntary payments rather than to rely on the sender's costly signaling.
In the present study, I focus on information transmission via cheap talk communication and show the benefit of long-term communication with voluntary transfers. By contrast, Hörner and Skrzypacz (2016) study a model of gradual persuasion in which the sender is paid and gradually reveals "certifiable" information. They show that the sequential revelation of partially informative signals can increase payments to the sender who is trying to sell his information to the receiver.
In all the abovementioned studies, once the communication phase is over, the receiver chooses a project; that is, the project choice is once and for all. By contrast, in the studies mentioned hereafter, there are multiple rounds of communication and actions. More precisely, in each period, the sender sends a message and the receiver chooses a project. Hence, these models differ from mine. Golosov et al. (2014) study strategic information transmission in a finitely repeated cheap talk game. Only the sender knows the state of the world, which remains constant through out the game. They show that the sender can condition his message on the receiver's past actions; in addition, the receiver can choose actions that reward the sender for following a path of messages that eventually leads to the full revelation of information. In contrast to this result, there is no fully revealing equilibrium in my model. Kolotilin and Li (2017) investigate the optimal relational contracts in an infinitely repeated cheap talk game. In their model, both the sender and receiver can pay each other. Therefore, there are equilibria in which the sender always reveals his private information completely. They show that full separation can be attained in the equilibrium, whereas partial or complete pooling is optimal if preferences are divergent. In contrast to my study, the sender's private information is not persistent in their model. Hence, gradual information transmission does not appear.
Paper Outline The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model. Section 3 derives the general properties of the perfect Bayesian equilibria in the model. Section 4 analyzes the uniform-quadratic model and shows the benefits of multistage information transmission with voluntary monetary transfers. Section 4.1 shows the two main results by constructing an equilibrium in which information is transmitted within two periods. Section 4.2 shows the benefit of long-term communication. Section 4.3 provides some properties of the optimal equilibria. Section 4.4 discusses the implications for organization design. In Section 4.5, I compare my communication procedure with the sender's optimal signaling. Section 5 generalizes the players' payoff functions and prior probability distribution, and describes two results that correspond to the results in Section 4.1. Section 6 gives some concluding remarks.
Model
There are two players, a sender (S) and a receiver (R). R has the authority to choose a project y ∈ Y ≡ R + , but the outcome produced by project y depends on S's private information, θ ∈ Θ ≡ [0, 1], which is distributed according to a differentiable distribution function G(·) with density g(·).
Before R chooses a project, R and S engage in T-period communication. Each period consists of two stages, stage 1 and stage 2. At stage 1, S sends a costless and unverifiable message to R. Let M ≡ [0, 1] be S's message space. I denote by m t a message sent by S at stage 1 in period t. At stage 2, R voluntarily pays money to S. Let W ≡ R + be the set of the amount of payment possible for R. I denote by w t a payment amount, which R pays to S at stage 2 in period t. After T-period communication, the game proceeds to period T + 1, in which R chooses a project.
Let w be a sequence of transfers, w ≡ (w 1 , . . . , w T ) ∈ W T . The players' payoff functions U R : Y × Θ × W T → R and U S : Y × Θ × W T → R are defined as follows:
where r, s, and b are positive constants. The term ∑ T t=1 w t represents the total amount of payments.
Here, r · u R (y, θ) and s · u S (y, θ, b) denote utilities from project y for R and S, respectively. The functions u R and u S satisfy CS's assumptions:
• u S is twice-continuously differentiable in y, θ, and b for all y ∈ R + , θ ∈ Θ, and b ∈ R + ;
• for all θ ∈ Θ and b ∈ R + , there exists y ∈ R + such that u
(y, θ, b) = 0; and
Under these assumptions, for each given (θ, b), there exists a unique maximizing project: y R (θ) = arg max y u R (y, θ) and y S (θ, b) = arg max y u S (y, θ, b). Parameter b > 0 represents "bias," which measures how much S's interest differs from R's. Since u S 13 (y, θ, b) > 0 and b > 0, I obtain y R (θ) < y S (θ, b). Constants r > 0 and s > 0 are scalar parameters that measure the relative importance of the project choice versus transfer payments.
The timing of game is summarized as follows:
1. Before the game starts, nature randomly draws a state θ ∈ Θ with common prior G(θ), and S observes θ privately.
2. R and S engage in T-period communication.
• At stage 1 in period t, S sends a message m t to the decision maker,
• At stage 2 in period t, R voluntarily pays w t to S. 
History and Strategies
A (public) history h (t, j) is defined as a sequence of players' past actions realized until the beginning of stage j in period t.
A (public) history h T+1 is defined as a sequence of players' past actions realized until the beginning of period T + 1, in which R chooses a project.
Let H (t, j) and H T+1 be the set of h (t, j) and h T+1 , respectively. I assume that H (1, 1) is a singleton set {ϕ}. I denote the set of all histories at stage j by 
Equilibrium
I analyze (weak) perfect Bayesian equilibria 16 : both players' strategies must maximize their expected payoffs after all histories, and the system of beliefs f must be consistent with the regular conditional probability derived from ((σ, ρ), f ) and G. 17 The formal definition of perfect Bayesian equilibria can be found in Appendix 3.A. Hereafter, I call a perfect Bayesian equilibrium simply equilibrium. In this section, I derives the general properties of the equilibria.
Relationship to the CS Model
I discuss the relationship between the equilibria in the CS model and those in Γ(b, s, r, T). Since R cannot obtain additional information about θ after stage 2 in period T, she has no incentive to choose w T > 0. Therefore, w T must be equal to 0 in any equilibrium. Consequently, Γ(b, s, r, 1) is essentially equivalent to the CS model, and I call it the one-shot cheap talk game. CS have shown that under the one-shot cheap talk communication, for every b > 0, there exists a positive integerñ(b) such that, for every n ∈ {1, . . . ,ñ(b)}, there exists at least one equilibrium with an n-element partition: {[a n , a n−1 ), [a n−1 , a n−2 ), . . . , [a 1 , a 0 ]}. In this equilibrium, S's type θ ∈ [a i+1 , a i ) conveys that his type belongs to this interval, and after receiving the message that "θ belongs to [a i+1 , a i )," R chooses the project
, a i ) is strictly increasing in both of its arguments. Since S whose type falls on a boundary between adjacent intervals is indifferent between the associated values of y, the following must be satisfied: for i = 1, . . . , n − 1,
1 Θ → [0, 1] with the following two properties:
is a probability measure. The definition of σ originates from Milgrom and Weber (1985) . 15 Due to the strict concavity of R's preference over projects, she never mixes projects in period T + 1. 16 There always exists an equilibrium that is essentially equivalent to a perfect Bayesian equilibrium in the CS model. Hence, in this study, I do not prove the existence theorem. 17 Suppose that ((σ, ρ), f ) is an equilibrium. At any payment stage history h (t,2) , R does not obtain additional information about S's type from her own action w t . Therefore, I require that at any h (t,2) , any deviation by R from ρ(h (t,2) ) does not affect the beliefs she uses as the basis for belief updating.
I call a sequence a ≡ {a 0 , . . . , a n } a (backward) solution of (1) if a satisfies (1)-(3). I impose the following monotonicity condition on a solution of (1).
Condition M .
If a ′ and a ′′ are two solutions of (1) with
This condition is met by the uniform-quadratic case: 2 , and G(θ) is uniform distribution over [0, 1] . CS show that Condition M also holds for more general specifications.
Consider a strategy profile such that S sends an informative message only at stage 1 in period 1 and R pays nothing to S at any payment stage. Obviously, if both S's behavior regarding sending m 1 and R's behavior regarding choosing y depending on m 1 are the same as an equilibrium in the CS model, then this strategy profile constitutes an equilibrium in Γ(b, s, r, T). This outcome immediately yields the following Fact 1. 
Relationship to Direct Contract
In this subsection, I first characterize the relationship between equilibria in Γ(b, s, r, T) and those in a case in which R can sign a contract that specifies the transfer as functions of messages sent by S.
Fix an equilibrium ξ = ((σ, ρ), f ). Let µ ξ : Θ → ∆(M T ) be a probability distribution induced by (σ, ρ) over M T . When a sequence of messages m ∈ M T is given, a sequence of payments w ∈ W T and a project y are induced from ρ. Let ω ξ : M T → W T and y ξ : M T → Y be the functions induced by ρ, respectively. Now, consider the case in which R can write a indirect contract (M T , ω ξ ). By the construction of ω ξ : M T → W T , under this contract, the strategy profile and belief system ((µ ξ , y ξ ), f ) constitutes an equilibrium whose outcome is equivalent to ξ in the sense that both this equilibrium and ξ induce the same probability distribution over W T × Y for any θ.
Next, I discuss the relationship between equilibria under this indirect contract (M T , ω ξ ) and those under a direct contract in which R can sign a contract that specifies the transfer as functions of the direct message m ∈ Θ sent by S. Let (Θ, ω) be a direct contract under which S reports θ ∈ Θ and R pays ω(θ) for S. Let y : Θ → Y be R's strategy under the direct contract (Θ, ω). By the application of the result of Krishna and Morgan (2008) , 18 I immediately obtain the following Fact 2.
Fact 2.
Consider an equilibrium under (M T , ω ξ ). There exists a direct contract (Θ, ω) under which there exists a pure strategy equilibrium that is outcome equivalent to the given equilibrium under (M T , ω ξ ).
Finally, I characterize the relationship between equilibria in Γ(b, s, r, T) and those under a direct contract (Θ, ω). The following Proposition 1 shows that given an equilibrium ξ in Γ(b, s, r, T), there exists an equilibrium of a direct contract that is outcome 18 For details, see Proposition 2 and Appendix B in Krishna and Morgan (2008) . equivalent in the sense that it results in the same projects and transfer as in the original equilibrium ξ for almost every state.
Proposition 1.
Fix an equilibrium ξ in Γ(b, s, r, T). There exists a direct contract (Θ, ω) under which there exists a pure strategy equilibrium that is outcome equivalent to ξ.
Proof. In the indirect contract cases, ω ξ (m) specifies a sequence of payments, w 1 (m), . . . , w T (m), dependently on m. In the direct contract case, ω(θ) specifies the resulting transfer dependently on θ. Fact 2 shows that there exists a direct contract (Θ, ω) such that ω(θ) = ∑ T t=1 w t (m) = ∑ T t=1 w t (m ′ ) and y(θ) = y ξ (m) = y ξ (m ′ ) for almost every θ and for any m, m ′ ∈ suppµ ξ (·|θ). This result means that the outcome of ξ can be replicated by a direct contract (Θ, ω). □
Partition Equilibrium
As is the case in the CS model, all the equilibria in Γ(b, s, r, T) are interval partitional, that is, all the equilibria are partition equilibria. The proof is in Appendix 3.C. If R can commit herself to compensating for S's message, fully separating equilibria (full revelation contracts) are always feasible. However, in my model, since there is neither commitment nor contractibility, R pays money to S only when paying money is optimal for her. For S's truth telling to be incentive 19 For all λ λ ′ , I λ ∩ I λ ′ = ∅. For all λ ∈ Λ, I λ is convex, and
compatible, the resulting sum of transfers must be different for each θ ∈ Θ. Precisely, ω(θ) must be strictly decreasing in θ ∈ Θ. This means that if the given R's payment strategy leads to S's truth telling, R almost certainly reaches a history where she pays a certain amount of money to S even though she has already detected the true state. At such a history, R has no incentive to pay. For this reason, there is no fully separating equilibrium.
Whether the cardinality of the equilibrium partition is finite remains an open question. Next, I provide a sufficient condition (Assumptions 1 and 2) for the cardinality of the equilibrium partition to be finite.
Assumption 1. S's utility function u S satisfies
where ψ ′′ (·) < 0 and ψ ′ (0) = 0.
Assumption 2. The distribution G and R's utility function u R jointly satisfy: for any colsed interval [a, a] with
Assumption 2 is mild. For example, suppose that u R (y, θ, b) = l(|y − θ|), where l ′′ (·) < 0 and l ′ (0) = 0, and that G is non increasing. Then, the inequality (4) holds.
Proposition 4. Under Assumption 1 and 2, in any equilibrium, the equilibrium partition has a finite number of elements.
The proof is in Appendix 3.D. Proposition 4 shows that under Assumptions 1 and 2, the equilibrium partition is a finite set. In Appendix 4.E, I discuss the fact that an equilibrium which has separating intervals in its partition might exist if Assumption 2 is not satisfied.
Hereafter, [a λ , a λ−1 ) denotes I λ , and ω λ denotes ω(θ) for θ ∈ [a λ , a λ−1 ). In any equilibrium, there must existλ ∈ Λ such that ωλ +1 ≤ ωλ. 20 From S's incentive compatibility condition, Figure 1 illustrates the inequality (5). The blue curve is ψ(|y(aλ +1 , aλ) − θ − b|), and the red curve is ψ(|y(aλ, aλ
Since y(aλ +1 , aλ) < aλ, the left-hand side of the inequality (5) is less than ψ(b). Moreover, from Assumption 2, the right-hand side of the inequality (5) is higher than ψ([aλ −1 − aλ]/2). Therefore, I must have aλ −1 − aλ > 2b irrespective of the length of the communication phase. 
This result implies that in any equilibrium, at history h T+1 where R believes that θ ∈ [aλ, aλ −1 ), R's conditional expected utility from project is strictly less than the optimal:
Moreover, R reaches such a history with probability
Hence, in any equilibrium, R's expected payoff is strictly less than
To make the characterization more specific, I assume the following.
Assumption 3. R's utility from project u R satisfies
where l ′′ (·) < 0 and l ′ (0) = 0.
Assumption 4. The distribution G is the uniform distribution.
Under Assumptions 3 and 4, Assumption 2 is satisfied.
Proposition 5. Under Assumptions 1, 3, and 4, the upper bound of R's equilibrium payoff is given by
The proof is in Appendix 3.F. One of the main findings in my analysis is that when T is sufficiently high and s/r is small enough, this upper bound U(b, r) can be approximated by R's equilibrium payoff. For the details of this result, see Proposition 11 in Section 4.
The Uniform-quadratic Case
In this section, I show the benefits of multistage information transmission with voluntary payments, concentrating on the well-known uniform-quadratic case: 2 , and G(θ) is a uniform distribution over Θ.
Two-period Information Elicitation
The key idea on which I build the analysis is that the dependence of future information on past payments ensures that R makes message-contingent payments. To understand the intuition behind this idea, I construct an equilibrium in which information is transmitted within two periods and R pays a positive amount of money to S on the equilibrium path. By constructing such an equilibrium, I show that multistage information transmission with voluntary payments can be more beneficial for both S and R than the one-shot cheap talk communication. In Section 5, I generalize the players' payoff functions and prior probability distribution and show the results that correspond to those in this subsection.
Suppose that b ∈ (1/12, 1/4). Then, there are two equilibria in the one-shot cheap talk game. One is the uninformative equilibrium: the babbling equilibrium. The other is a partially informative equilibrium: a 0 = 1, a 1 = 1/2 − 2b and a 2 = 0. CS have shown that both S and R prefer the partially informative equilibrium to the uninformative equilibrium. In the partially informative equilibrium, the ex ante expected payoff of R is −r(1/48 + b 2 ) whereas that of S is −s(1/48
The first result establishes that if T ≥ 2 and r is large relative to s, there exists an equilibrium whose partition has more steps than the one-shot cheap talk game does.
there is a continuum of 3-element partition equilibria.
I characterize a class of 3-element partition equilibria in which information is transmitted in order from the rightmost element of the equilibrium partition. In the equilibrium, S gradually conveys his information within the first and second period. If S conveys information contrary to his bias in the first period, then R pays to S in order to extract more precise information in the second period. If R does not pay in the first period, then S never gives additional information. As s becomes smaller, the necessary payment becomes smaller since the effect of the message-contingent payment on S's incentive becomes larger. Furthermore, as r becomes higher, the punishment by babbling message becomes more severe. This is the reason why s/r needs to be small enough.
Proof. Consider a strategy profile under which the information is transmitted in the following steps. At stage 1 in period 1, S of type θ < a 1 randomly sends a message m 1 according to a uniform distribution over [0, a 1 ), and S of type θ ≥ a 1 randomly sends a message m 1 according to a uniform distribution over [a 1 , 1] . If R receives m 1 < a 1 at stage 1 in period 1, then she pays w 1 = w to S. Otherwise, she pays nothing to S at stage 2 in period 1. At stage 1 in period 2, if m 1 < a 1 and w 1 ≥ w, then S of type θ < a 2 randomly sends a message m 2 according to a uniform distribution over [0, a 2 ), and S of type θ ≥ a 2 randomly sends a message m 2 according to a uniform distribution over [a 2 , 1]. Otherwise, S conveys no information, i.e., any type of S randomly sends a message m 2 according to a uniform distribution over [0, 1] . In period t ≥ 2, R pays nothing to S. In period t ≥ 3, S conveys no information.
Once communication is over, R chooses her best project based on the information she has. At h T+1 such that m 1 ≥ a 1 , since R believes θ is uniformly distributed over [a 1 , 1], the optimal project for R is y 1 = (a 1 + 1)/2. At h T+1 such that m 1 < a 1 , w 1 ≥ w, and m 2 ≥ a 2 , since R believes θ is uniformly distributed over [a 2 , a 1 ), the optimal project for R is y 2 = (a 2 + a 1 )/2. At h T+1 such that m 1 < a 1 , w 1 ≥ w, and m 2 < a 2 , since R believes θ is uniformly distributed over [0, a 2 ), the optimal project for R is y 3 = a 2 /2. At h T+1 such that m 1 < a 1 and w 1 < w, since R believes θ is uniformly distributed over [0, a 1 ), the optimal project for R isỹ = a 1 /2. Figure 2 illustrates the equilibrium strategy.
Figure 2: Equilibrium Strategy
In what follows, I ensure that by taking a 1 , a 2 and w suitably, I can construct an equilibrium in which S and R follow the abovementioned strategy profile.
In period t ≥ 2, R always pays nothing to S. Therefore, the partition {[0, a 2 ), [a 2 , a 1 )} must coincide with the 2-element equilibrium partition achieved in the one-shot cheap talk game in which θ is drawn from the uniform distribution over [0, a 1 ). By CS, the following must be satisfied:
Since I now focus on a 3-element partition equilibrium, I must have a 2 > 0. Hence, a 1 > 4b must be satisfied. Under the abovementioned strategy profile, S of type θ ∈ (a i , a i−1 ) sends messages so that y i would be chosen by R. Hence, S's payoff is derived as follows:
Since I suppose that a 2 = a 1 /2 − 2b, I obtain
Clearly, at stage 1 in period 2 such that m 1 < a 1 and w 1 ≥ w, S has no incentive to deviate from the given strategy. Moreover, if m 1 < a 1 and w 1 < w, or if m 1 ≥ a 1 , S conveys no information. Therefore, S has no incentive to deviate at such a history. The same can be said in period t ≥ 3. Hence, I conclude that S has no incentive to deviate in period t ≥ 2 when
If the following equation (8) holds, then the inequalities (9) and (10) hold.
. (10) If (9) and (10) hold, S has no incentive to deviate at stage 1 in period 1. By equation (8), I obtain
Since w(a 1 ) is strictly increasing in
where w ∈ (w(4b), w (1)). In summary, I conclude that S has no incentive to deviate from the given strategy when the boundaries of the partition satisfy the following conditions:
where w ∈ (w(4b), w(1)). Figure 3 illustrates S's incentive compatibility conditions. At any h (t,2) , R has no incentive to increase the amount of payment because it would not affect S's behavior. Therefore, I have only to ensure that paying w is optimal for R after receiving m 1 < a 1 .
If R pays w 1 ≥ w after receiving m 1 < a 1 , then she obtains u * (w 1 ): 
On the other hand, by paying w 1 < w, R obtains u(w 1 ):
The payoffs u * (w 1 ) and u(w 1 ) have a unique maximum at w 1 = w and w 1 = 0, respectively. Thus, paying w is an optimal decision for R if and only if u * (w) ≥ u(0). Using condition (12) yields
Since
• a 1 (w) is strictly increasing in w;
− b 2 > 0 and
− b 2 = 0;
Hence, if r({a 1 (w(1))} 2 /16 − b 2 ) > w(1), then there exists w ∈ (w(4b), w(1)) such that for all w ∈ [w, w(1)), the inequality (13) holds. Since a 1 (w(1)) = 1 and w(1) = s(1 + 4b)(1 + 12b)/16, the inequality r({a 1 
Therefore, if s/r < (1 − 4b)/(1 + 12b), then the given strategy profile and the system of beliefs constitute an equilibrium when w ∈ [w, w (1) ) and the boundaries of partition satisfy the condition (12) . □ Remark 1. In the equilibrium, meaningful information transmission must occur after R pays w. For this reason, in the equilibrium outlined above, it is necessary that a 2 = a 1 /2 − 2b > 0. Hence, both 4b < a 1 and b < 1/4 must be satisfied.
There is a possibility of the existence of a 3-element partition equilibrium in which S conveys information in a different order. For example, consider the following strategy profile. In period 1, S reveals whether θ ≥ a 2 . If θ ≥ a 2 , then R paysw, and then, S reveals whether θ < a 1 . Note that a 2 < a 1 . The following Proposition 7 shows that there is no equilibrium where information is transmitted in such a way.
Proposition 7. Fix b ∈ (1/12, 1/4). There exists no 3-element partition equilibrium such that information is transmitted in order from the leftmost element of the equilibrium partition.
The proof of is in Appendix 4.A. Under the abovementioned strategy profile, R paysw > 0 only when she receive the message that means θ ≥ a 2 . Intuitively, this payment strategy affects S's incentive for misrepresentation negatively, since it strengthens S's exaggeration incentive. Hence, I cannot have equilibria in which information is transmitted in order from the leftmost element of the equilibrium partition.
It can be confirmed that if r is large relative to s, R can obtain the greater expected "revenue from the project" under a 3-element partition equilibrium constructed in Proposition 6 than under the 2-element partition equilibrium in the one-shot cheap talk game. This result is due to the fact that R can obtain more detailed information about S's type. However, since R has to make a payment under the 3-element partition equilibrium, multistage information transmission with voluntary transfer payments is not always beneficial to R. I now show the second result that when r is large relative to s, multistage information transmission with voluntary transfer payments is more beneficial to both R and S than the one-shot cheap talk communication.
In the one-shot cheap talk game, both players always strictly prefer the 2-element partition equilibrium to the babbling equilibrium from the ex-ante perspective. Let EÛ κ be the ex ante expected payoff of κ ∈ {R, S} under the 2-element partition equilibrium in the one-shot cheap talk game. I denote by {[ã 2 ,ã 1 )[ã 1 ,ã 0 ] the equilibrium partition. As noted earlier,ã 1 = 1/2 − 2b. Let EU κ (x) be the ex ante expected payoff of κ ∈ {R, S} in the 3-element partition equilibrium with x = a 1 and a 2 = x/2 − 2b.
The following lemma shows that if r is large relative to s, there exists a 3-element partition equilibrium that R prefers to all the equilibria in the one-shot cheap talk game.
Lemma 1. There exists a positive value
Proof. Suppose that s/r < (1 − 4b)/(1 + 12b). Fix a 3-element partition equilibrium constructed in the proof of Proposition 6. By the definition of a 1 (w), I have
CS show that , 1) . This completes the proof of Lemma 1. □ Remark 2. Note that x is almost equal to 1. Then, boundaries of the 3-element partition equilibrium almost coincide with boundaries of the 2-element partition equilibrium in the one-shot cheap talk game. Nevertheless, the payment of monetary transfer is strictly higher than 0. Therefore, if s/r < (1 − 4b)/(1 + 12b), there always exists a 3-element partition equilibrium that is unfavorable to R: there existsε > 0 such that η * (b, x) < s/r for all x ∈ (1 −ε, 1).
Next, I show the following lemma.
Lemma 2. EU
Proof. Recall that EU S (x) denotes the ex ante expected payoff of S under the 3-element partition equilibrium with a 1 = x ∈ (a, 1) . I obtain
CS show that It is known that the existence of a non-strategic mediator leads to improved information transmission. Now, I compare my communication procedure with optimal mediation. In the mediation model, S can send a message to an impartial mediator, who then passes on a recommendation to R according to some predetermined stochastic rule. R chooses her best project based on the recommendation from mediator. Goltsman et al. (2009) characterize the optimal mediation under which R's ex ante expected payoff is −rb(1 − b)/3. The following Proposition 9 shows that in two-period information elicitation with voluntary monetary transfer, R can obtain higher ex ante expected payoff than that under the optimal mediation.
Since this proposition can be proved in the same way as the proof of Lemma 1, the formal proof is omitted. When b is almost equal to 1/4, boundaries of the 3-element partition equilibrium almost coincide with those of the 2-element partition equilibrium in the one-shot cheap talk game: a 1 ≈ 1 and a 2 ≈ 1/2 − 2b. The value of −rb(1 − b)/3 is always strictly higher than R's equilibrium payoff under the 2-element partition equilibrium in the one-shot cheap talk game. Therefore, the parameter b needs to be strictly less than 1/4. 21 Note that 
Effective Long-term Communication
In the previous subsection, I focus on the equilibrium in which information is transmitted within only two periods, regardless of the length of communication. It seems that R does not use T-period communication effectively. In this subsection, I show the benefit of long-term communication.
Recall my earlier discussion of the upper bound of R's equilibrium payoff. Proposition 5 provides it as
One of the main findings in my analysis is that when T is long enough, this upper bound U(b, r) = −16rb 3 /3 can be approximated by R's equilibrium payoff. First, I demonstrate that under a certain condition, there exists an equilibrium in which information is transmitted within the whole T-period in order from the rightmost element of the equilibrium partition. Specifically, I consider the following information elicitation. In period 1, S conveys whether the value of θ is less than a 1 . If θ < a 1 , then R pays a certain amount of money. After that, in period 2, S conveys whether the value of θ is less than a 2 . If θ < a 2 , then R pays again. This information elicitation is repeated until the last period in the communication phase. In the last period, S of type θ < a T−1 conveys whether the value of θ is less than a T . Under this communication process, R eventually learns to which element of a partition {[a t+1 , a t )} T t=1 ∪ [a 1 , a 0 ] the state θ belongs. I call this communication process (monotone) effective T-period communication. 22 Figure 4 illustrates this information elicitation. Under the effective T-period communication, the information is transmitted in the following steps. At h (t,1) such that m t ′ < a t ′ and w t ′ ≥ w * t ′ for all t ′ < t, S of type θ < a t randomly sends a message m t according to a uniform distribution over [0, a t ), and S of type θ ≥ a t randomly sends a message m t according to a uniform distribution over [a t , 1]. Otherwise, any type of S randomly sends a message according to the same distribution, a uniform distribution over [0, 1] . If S conveys that θ < a t at stage 1 in period t, then R pays w * t to S at stage 2. Otherwise, he pays nothing. Let I(h T+1 ) be the closure of {θ ∈ Θ : f (θ|h T+1 ) > 0}. Under the abovementioned strategy profile, for any h T+1 , the closed set
, and R's posterior belief f (θ|h T+1 ) is a uniformly distribution on I(h T+1 ). Therefore, R
at h T+1 . At h (T,2) such that m t ′ < a t ′ and w t ′ ≥ w * t ′ for all t ′ < T, since R does not obtain additional information after making a payment, w * T must be equal to 0. Therefore, {[a T+1 , a T ), [a T , a T−1 )} coincides with the 2-element equilibrium partition achieved in the one shot cheap talk game where Θ = [0, a T−1 ). Hence, I obtain
This implies that a T−1 > 4b. Define a t and w * t as follows:
− 2b for t = T,
Suppose that a < (1−4b)/(T−1). Then, 4b < a T−1 and a t−1 −a t = a > 0 for t ∈ {1, . . . , T−1}.
}, the given boundaries and payments are well-defined. Moreover, for any t ∈ {1, . . . , T − 1}, w * t becomes a solution to an equation,
induced by S's incentive compatibility condition: S whose type falls on the boundaries between adjacent intervals is indifferent between the associated values of y.
The abovementioned strategy profile and system of beliefs, hereafter ξ T , cannot always be an equilibrium. Whether it is so depends on the value of a. I show that ξ T can be an equilibrium when a is small enough. R's payment w * t in each t ≤ T − 2 goes to 0 as a goes to 0. Consider a history at stage 2 in period T − 1 such that m t < a t for all t ≤ T − 1 and w t ≥ w * t for all t < T − 1. Then, there are two cheap talk equilibria in the remaining game: the babbling equilibrium and the 2-element partition equilibrium. Since I now suppose that a ≈ 0, if the 2-element partition equilibrium is chosen in period T, R's continuation payoff is approximated by −r(b 2
Thus, R has an incentive to pay w *
T−1
at this history so that the babbling equilibrium would not be chosen in the last period. Furthermore, at h (t,2) where R pays w * t , if w * t is small enough, R pays to ensure that the babbling equilibrium would not be chosen in the future. Hence, by taking a small enough, I can construct an equilibrium with effective T-period communication. The formal proof is found in Appendix 4.B. Proposition 10 shows only the possibility of the effective T-period communication. In order for ξ T to be an equilibrium, it might be necessary for a T−1 to be close to 1. If a T−1 is close to 1, R reaches a history h (T,1) at which I(h (T,1) ) = [0, a T−1 ] with a high probability on the equilibrium path. Moreover, {[a T+1 , a T ), [a T , a T−1 )} almost coincides with the 2-element equilibrium partition achieved in the one-shot cheap talk game. In such a case, the initial (T −1)-period communication does not have much meaning from ex ante perspective. However, as S becomes less concerned with the project, the effects of monetary transfer on S's incentive becomes larger. In other words, the necessary payments for controlling S's incentive goes to 0 as s goes to 0. Hence, if s is small enough, it is not necessary for a T−1 to be close to 1. This fact suggests that long-term communication becomes more beneficial for R as s becomes smaller. To see this, I show the following Proposition 11.
Proposition 11. Fix b ∈ (0, 1/4). For any d > 0, there exists T(b, d) and η(b, d) such that if T ≥ T(b, d) and s/r < η(b, d), R can obtain a higher ex ante expected payoff than
The proof is in Appendix 4.C. I earlier show that an upper bound of R's equilibrium payoff is −16rb 3 /3. This Proposition 11 shows that if the communication phase has a sufficiently large number of periods and S weighs transfer payments more heavily than the project choice, this upper bound can be approximated by R's equilibrium payoff.
Some Properties of Optimal Equilibria
Having shown that the upper bound −16rb 3 /3 can be approximated by R's equilibrium payoff, it remains to identify the characteristics of an optimal equilibrium. Let ξ d be an equilibrium where R's equilibrium payoff is higher than −16rb 3 /3 − rd. Proposition 11 shows that the set of parameters that guarantees the existence of ) receives under ξ d . 23 Since 2 . if ω λ+1 ≤ ω λ , the width of the interval I λ is strictly higher than 4b:
LetΛ be the number of intervals such that ω λ+1 ≤ ω λ :Λ ≡ #{λ ∈ {1, . . . , Λ} : ω λ+1 ≤ ω λ }. The following proposition establishes the relationship between d andΛ.
Proposition 12. Fix d > 0 and Γ(d).
Then, in any ξ d ∈ Ξ d , the following must be satisfied:
Proof. Under the given equilibrium ξ d , the ex ante expected payoff of R is given by ), then R certainly reaches a history h (t,2) such that she pays a positive amount of money even though she does not obtain additional information in the future: {θ ∈ Θ : f (θ|h (t,2) 
] and ρ(h (t,2) ) > 0. Hence, I conclude thatΛ = 1, and ω Λ ≤ ω λ ′ for some λ ′ < Λ. In the same way as this result, the inequality ω λ ′ ≤ ω Λ holds. This completes the proof of Corollary 2. □
Comparison with Predetermined Decision Rules
Now, under the uniform-quadratic assumption, I compare my communication procedure with both delegation and arbitration. When R delegates control, her payoff is given by −rb 2 . As shown by CS, the ex ante expected payoff of R under the one-shot cheap talk communication is given by
) , 23 Suppose that (Θ, ω d ) is a direct contract under which there exists a pure strategy equilibrium that is outcome equivalent to
where n ∈ {1, . . . ,ñ}. The maximum number of partition equilibrium outcomesñ is given byñ
where ⌈x⌉ denotes the smallest integer greater than or equal to x. Dessein (2002) Next, consider the situation in which arbitration is available. Under arbitration, S sends a message to a neutral third party (arbitrator), and after receiving the messages, the arbitrator announces a project. This announcement serves as a binding recommendation to R. In other words, R cannot choose any action that is different from the recommended one. Goltsman et al. (2009) characterize the optimal arbitration rule and show that R's ex ante expected payoff under optimal arbitration is −rb 2 (1 − 4b/3). 24 I immediately verify that if d < b 2 (1 − 4b/3) − 16b 3 /3 and b < 3/20, the inequality −16rb 3 /3 − rd > −rb 2 (1 − 4b/3) holds.
Therefore, Proposition 11 implies that when the communication phase has a sufficiently large number of periods and R places greater importance on the project than S does, R can obtain higher ex ante expected payoff than under delegation and arbitration. 25 
Comparison with Sender-optimal Signaling
As noted in Section 1, costly signaling helps people convey their private information credibly. Naturally enough, even in my setting, if S can send a costly message (paying money to R) to signal information, a fully separating equilibrium that is optimal from R's perspective can exist. However, it is known that under general assumptions, the perfect separation is never optimal from S's perspective although it is feasible. 26 Karamychev and Visser (2016) study an amendment to the CS model by allowing S to use both costless and costly messages. They show that in S's optimal equilibrium, S pays to adjust the pooling intervals. Moreover, under the uniform-quadratic assumption, they characterize Sender-optimal equilibria whose partition has at most n + 1 steps. 27 In such equilibria, R's expected payoff is less than −r/{12(ñ + 1) 2 }. Sincẽ n ≡ ⌈(
. 24 Having restricted attention to deterministic mechanism, Melumad and Shibano (1991) provide the optimal arbitration (optimal delegation) rule. 25 Since the optimal arbitration rule dominates the optimal mediation rule, my communication protocol could strictly dominate the optimal mediation rule. 26 de Haan et al. (2015) experimentally study the strategic information transmission in a setting where both cheap talk and burning money are available, and they find that the individuals who supply information prefer to communicate through cheap talk. 27 See Proposition 4 in Karamychev and Visser (2016).
Therefore, ifñ > 4 holds, I obtain
This inequality and Proposition 11 suggest that in some cases, it might be better for R to generate the signaling structure by herself through voluntary payment rather than to rely on S's costly signaling.
Generalization of Proposition 6 and Proposition 8
In this section, under the more general settings where the players' payoff function and the prior probability of the state are kept as is in Section 2, I show two results that correspond to the results in Section 4.1.
Recall thatñ (≡ñ(b) in Section 3.1) denotes the maximum number of elements of equilibrium partition achievable in the one-shot cheap talk game. As can be observed from the uniform-quadratic case, under my equilibrium construction in Proposition 6, after S conveys some information in period 1, there must be multiple equilibria in the remaining game. Therefore, I assume thatñ ≥ 2. In the one-shot cheap talk game, if Condition M holds, then the most informative equilibrium isñ-element partition equilibrium where {[ãñ,ãñ −1 ), . . . [ã 1 ,ã 0 ]}, and 0 =ãñ <ãñ −1 < · · · <ã 1 <ã 0 = 1.
The following Proposition 13 establishes that an equilibrium whose partition has more steps that that in the one-shot cheap talk game exists. At stage 1 in period 1, S conveys whether θ <â 1 . If θ <â 1 , then R pays a certain amount of money, w * , to S at stage 2 in period 1. Otherwise, she pays nothing to S. If θ < a 1 and w 1 ≥ w * , at stage 1 in period 2, S conveys to which element of {[âñ +1 ,âñ), . . . [â 2 ,â 1 )} the true state θ belongs. Otherwise, S conveys no information regardless of his type. In period t ≥ 2, R always pays nothing to S. In period t ≥ 3, S conveys no information.
In the rest of this section, I denote by (σ,ρ) the strategy profile defined above, and denote byf the belief system derived from (σ,ρ).
Under the strategy profile outlined above, I have to take an equilibrium partition whose boundaries {âñ +1 , . . . ,â 1 } coincide with those of theñ-element partition equilibrium in the one-shot cheap talk game, where the state space is [0,â 1 ). The following inequality must hold for R's payment w * to be optimal. I obtain
whereŴ(x) denotes R's ex ante expected utility from project: 
Concluding Remarks
In this study, I analyzed a cheap talk game in which an informed sender and an uninformed receiver engage in finite-period communication before the receiver makes a decision. During the communication phase, the sender sends a (cheap talk) message more than once and the receiver can pay money to the sender whenever she receives a message. I have shown that the dependence of future information on past payments creates an incentive for the receiver to pay money. This result ensures that the receiver makes message-contingent payments to some extent even in the situation in which there is no contractibility, and consequently, information transmission can be improved relative to the one-shot cheap talk communication without transfer payments.
Under the assumption of quadratic preferences and a uniform type distribution, I found the upper bound of the receiver's equilibrium payoff, and provided a sufficient condition for it to be approximated by the receiver's payoff under a certain equilibrium. Consequently, when the communication phase has a sufficiently large number of periods and the receiver places greater importance on the project than the sender does, multistage information transmission with voluntary payments can be more beneficial for the receiver than a wide class of other communication protocols (e.g., mediation, arbitration, and the sender's optimal signaling).
In this paper, I focused on the multistage unilateral communication. Intuitively, it seems that the sender's punishment by babbling message can create the receiver's payment incentive even in situations in which players engage in more general communication protocols such as multistage bilateral communication. Hence, a natural question to ask is whether the receiver's voluntary payment can work jointly with such general communication protocols? Considering such a model remains for further research. , m 1 , w 1 , . . . , m T , w T , y). 29 Let B(H) be the Borel algebra on H. Given a strategy profile and a prior distribution, ((σ, ρ) , G), a probability measure P on the measurable space (H, B(H)) is uniquely determined. Given h ∈ H, the values of players' payoffs, both U R and U S , are uniquely derived. Moreover, the functions U R : H → R and U S : H → R are measurable. Therefore, the players' ex ante expected payoffs E[U R (y, θ, w)|(σ, ρ)] and E[U R (y, θ, w)|(σ, ρ)] are well-defined. Let V S (σ, ρ|h (t,1) θ , m t ) and V R ((σ, ρ), f |h (t,2) , w t ) be the continuation payoff of S after sending m t at h (t,1) θ and the continuation payoff of R after paying w t at history h (t,2) , respectively.
Appendix Appendix 3.A Perfect Bayesian Equilibria
Let H ≡ Θ × M 1 × W 1 × · · · × M T × W T × Y be
Definition 2.
A strategy profile (σ, ρ) and a belief system f constitute a perfect Bayesian equilibrium if the following conditions hold. For any t ∈ {1, . . . , T},
for any h
4. the belief system f is consistent with (σ, ρ).
Consistency of the belief system
Given h (t,2) , the belief system induces a probability measure f (·|h (t,2) ) on (Θ, B(Θ)).
Moreover, since S's behavior strategy σ(M, ·|h (t,2) , w t ) : Θ → [0, 1] is measurable for anỹ M ∈ B(M t+1 ) and w t ∈ W t , I can uniquely define probability measureP(
Therefore, I calculate the posterior belief: ifP(Θ ×M|h (t,2) , w t ) > 0, then
Moreover, fixΘ ∈ B(Θ), thenP(Θ, ·|h (t,2) , w t )/P(Θ, ·|h (t,2) , w t ) induce measuresν on (M t+1 , B(M t+1 )). Sinceν is absolutely continuous with respect to the Borel measure ν on (M t+1 , B(M t+1 )) and both measures are σ-finite, there exists a Radon-Nikodym derivative ζ(m t+1 |Θ, h (t,2) , w t ) such that for anyM ∈ B(M t+1 ),
Hence, I require that for m t+1 ∈ supp(ν),
where h (t+1,2) = (h (t,2) , w t , m t+1 ).
Appendix 3.B Proof of Proposition 2
Fix a pure strategy equilibrium under a direct contract (Θ, ω). Then, the existence of a partition {I λ } λ∈Λ that satisfies the conditions 2-3 in Definition 1 is trivial. Hence, I have only to ensure that I λ is convex for each λ ∈ Λ. First, I show that R's strategy regarding the project, y : Θ → Y, satisfies the following property.
Lemma 3.
In a pure strategy equilibrium under a direct contract (Θ, ω), R's strategy regarding the project, y(θ), is nondecreasing.
Proof of Lemma 3. From S's incentive compatibility condition, for any θ, θ ′ ∈ Θ,
, and
These inequalities can be simplified into
From Lemma 3, I immediately obtain the following lemma.
Lemma 4. In a pure strategy equilibrium under a direct contract
Lemma 4 implies the convexity of I λ .
Appendix 3.C Proof of Proposition 3
Suppose that a fully separating equilibrium ξ F exists. Let (Θ, ω F ) be a direct contract under which there exists a pure strategy equilibrium that is outcome equivalent to ξ F . Let y F (θ) be R's equilibrium strategy under (Θ, ω F ). Obviously, y F (θ) = y R (θ) = arg max y u R (y, θ). For truth telling to be incentive compatible, it is necessary to satisfy the following condition:
From the first-order condition, I obtain the differential equation
From condition (17) , the compensation schedule that induces full revelation is strictly decreasing in θ. Finally, I show that R's payment strategy satisfying condition (17) never satisfies the equilibrium condition. Let H(θ) be supp{P(·|θ)} whereP(·|θ) is the probability measure on (H T+1 , B(H T+1 )) induced by (σ, ρ) given θ: the set of h T+1 that has a positive probability under the given ξ F when the true state is θ.
Step 1: Fix θ ∈ (0, 1) and (m 1 , w 1 , . . . , m T , w T ) ∈ H(θ). Then, there exists t < T such that w t > 0 and w t = 0 for any t > t. Moreover, ∑ t t=1 w t = ω F (θ) holds. If supp{ f (·|(m 1 , w 1 , . . . , m t )} = {θ}, R has no incentive to pay w t at this history. Therefore, there exists a θ θ such that θ ∈ supp{ f (·|(m 1 , w 1 , . . . , m t )}. Furthermore, since ω F (θ) < ω F (θ) for θ > θ, I must have θ < θ. This implies that there must exist (m 1 , w 1 that (m 1 , w 1 , . . . , w t ) = (m 1 , w 1 , . . . , w t ), and w t > 0 for some t ∈ {t + 1, T − 1} ≡ T 1 .
Step 2: Let t be the maximum number that satisfies w t > 0. From the definition of t, ∑ t t=1 w t = ω F (θ) is satisfied. Similar to Step 1, there exists aθ < θ such that
For ξ F to be an equilibrium, the above operation must be repeated infinitely regardless of its start point θ. However, this is impossible in the set of finite numbers. Hence, I conclude that there exists no fully separating equilibrium.
Appendix 3.D Proof of Proposition 4
Fix an equilibrium ξ. Let (Θ, ω) be a direct contract under which there exists a pure strategy equilibrium that is outcome equivalent to ξ. Let y(θ) be R's equilibrium strategy under (Θ, ω). Proposition 2 shows that ξ is a partition equilibrium.
Let [a ′ , a ′′ ] be an element of the equilibrium partition 30 such that a ′ < a ′′ . Then, I have
LetΘ be the set of all boundaries of equilibrium partition. First, I show the following Claim 1. • ω is strictly decreasing in θ over [θ k+1 , θ k ] and [θ j , θ j−1 ], and
Claim 1. If there exists closed intervals
Proof of Claim 1. First, I show that ω is strictly decreasing in θ over [θ k+1 , θ k ] and [θ j , θ j−1 ]. For all θ ∈ [θ k+1 , θ k ], the truth telling to be a best response requires that
The first-order condition for S results in the differential equation
The same argument holds for interval [θ j , θ j−1 ]. Hence, I obtain
From conditions (19) and (20) From condition (18) , I conclude that s · u S (y(θ), θ, b) + ω(θ) is strictly decreasing in θ over [θ k , θ j ] ∩Θ. Therefore, the following must be satisfied
This outcome completes the proof of Claim 1. □ Now, I suppose that there exists an interval which is subset ofΘ. Let [θ k+1 , θ k ] be the leftmost interval such that [θ k+1 , θ k ] ⊂Θ and θ k+1 < θ k . By Claim 1, for almost
In the same way as the proof of Appendix 3.C, I can prove that this result contradicts the fact that the given strategy profile is an equilibrium. 32 Therefore, the equilibrium partition does not include any separating interval.
Next, I show that the cardinality ofΘ is finite. I prove this by contradiction. Suppose that the cardinality ofΘ is countably infinite: {I λ } λ∈N . Let [a n+1 , a n ) and [a n , a n−1 ) be adjacent elements of equilibrium partition. I denote by ω j the payment amount S of type θ ∈ [a j , a j−1 ) receives. I have the following Claim 2. 32 The proof is a straightforward application of each step I take in Appendix 3.C. Therefore, it is omitted. Claim 2. # {[a n , a n−1 ) ∈ {I λ } λ∈N : ω n ≥ ω n+1 } < +∞.
Proof of Claim 2. Since S of type θ = a n is indifferent between [a n+1 , a n ) and [a n , a n−1 ), the following must be satisfied: s · ψ(|y(a n+1 , a n ) − a n − b|) + ω n+1 = s · ψ(|y(a n , a n−1 ) − a n − b|) + ω n .
Hence, if ω n ≥ ω n+1 holds, I have s · ψ(|y(a n+1 , a n ) − a n − b|) ≥ s · ψ(|y(a n , a n−1 ) − a n − b|). Since s · ψ(|y(a n+1 , a n ) − a n − b|) is increasing in a n+1 ∈ [0, a n ], if ω n ≥ ω n+1 holds, I must have s · ψ(b) ≥ s · ψ(|y(a n , a n−1 ) − a n − b|).
ψ(|y − a n − b|) is strictly increasing in y ∈ [0, a n + b] and strictly decreasing in y ∈ [a n + b, ∞), and a n < y(a n , a n−1 ) < (a n + a n−1 )/2 + b. Therefore, if a n−1 − a n ≤ b is satisfied, s · ψ(b) < s · ψ(|y(a n , a n−1 ) − a n − b|). This means that if ω n ≥ ω n+1 holds, I must have a n−1 −a n > b. Therefore, it is satisfied that # {[a n , a n−1 ) ∈ {I λ } λ∈N : ω n ≥ ω n+1 } < 1/b. This completes the proof of Claim 2. □ Claim 2 implies that if the cardinality ofΘ is countably infinite, there exists an infinite sequence {[a j , a j−1 )} j∈N ⊂ {I λ } λ∈N such that ω j < ω j+1 , and
In the same way as the proof of Appendix 3.C, I can prove that this result contradicts the fact that the given strategy profile is an equilibrium. 33 Therefore, the cardinality ofΘ must be finite. Claim 1 and Claim 2 conclude that all equilibria are finite partition equilibria.
In the first period, S reveals whether θ belongs to (θ, θ). If θ ∈ (θ, θ), R paysŵ, and then, S reveals whether θ < θ 1 . If θ (θ, θ), R pays ω 1 in period 2. After this payment, S's types {ϵ, ϵ + θ} pool together and send message m ϵ . After receiving m ϵ , R pays
After receiving ω(ϵ), S reveals whether θ = ϵ or ϵ + θ. If R deviates in terms of payment in a period, S conveys no information thereafter. S's incentive compatibility condition is met by the second and third condition of the abovementioned requirements. Moreover, if s/r is small enough, R makes a payment to prevent S's babbling. However, even if the Assumption 2 is not satisfied, the existence of the pair (θ, θ 1 , θ) is not guaranteed.
It remains an open question.
Appendix 3.F Proof of Proposition 5
Since G is the uniform distribution and u R (y, θ, b) = l(|y − θ|), the optimal project for R is given by y(aλ, aλ
Since aλ +1 < aλ, the inequality (21) can be simplified into
Moreover, since aλ < aλ −1 , I obtain
Therefore, I obtain
Appendix 4.A Proof of Proposition 7
For S's incentive compatibility condition to be satisfied, the partition {[a 2 , a 1 ), [a 1 , 1]} must coincide with the 2-element equilibrium partition achieved in the one-shot cheap talk game where θ is drawn from the uniform distribution over [0, a 1 ). By CS, the boundary a 1 satisfies that
This equation implies that
Moreover, similar to the condition (8), the indifference condition for S of type θ = a 2 induces the following equation:
The value ofw is positive if and only if a 1 − a 2 > a 2 + 4b. This means that a 1 − a 2 > 4b. Hence, I obtain
Since I now suppose that b ∈ (1/12, 1/4), I obtain 12b + 3a 2 > 1. Therefore, boundaries of the partition and the paymentw are not well defined. This outcome implies that I cannot construct a 3-element partition equilibrium described in Proposition 7.
must pay nothing to S at such a history. If m t ′ < a t ′ and w t ′ ≥ w * t ′ for all t ′ < t and m t < a t , 35 by paying w t ≥ w * t , R obtains u * t (w t ):
On the other hand, by paying w t < w * t , she obtains u t (w t ):
Clearly, u * t (w t ) and u t (w t ) have a maximum at w t = w * t and w t = 0, respectively. Therefore, paying w * t is optimal for R if and only if u 
Appendix 4.C Proof of Proposition 11
I now impose a condition,
, a i and w * t are well defined. I now suppose that T >T(b) ≡ 1/8b + 1/2, and then a < (1 + 12b)/(T + 1) for any ε ∈ (0, 1 − 4b). Let ξ ε be this modified strategy profile and system of beliefs. The following lemma shows that if r is large relative to s, then ξ ε can be an equilibrium. Proof of Lemma 5. It is obvious that the restriction a = {1 − (4b + ε)}/(T − 1) affects only R's optimal decision at h (t,2) such that m t ′ < a t ′ and w t ′ ≥ w * t ′ for all t ′ < t − 1 and m t < a t . Therefore, I have only to ensure whether inequality (28) holds.
The left-hand side of the inequality (28) can be simplified into
35 R learns θ < a t at the immediately preceding stage.
Since a t = a T−1
This implies that
Moreover, since w * t > 0 , the right-hand side of the inequality (28) is higher than 0. Therefore, I obtain
Note that the value of w * i /s does not depend on s. Now, I conclude that there exists η(b, T, ε) such that if s/r < η(b, T, ε), then the inequality (29) holds and ξ ε constitutes an equilibrium. □ I denote by EU R (ε) the ex ante expected payoff of R under a strategy profile ξ ε .
rW(ε) denotes the expected revenue from the project under ξ ε :
This implies that for any
Recall that w * i is linearly increasing in s for all i ∈ {1, . . . , T}.
Define η(b, T, d) as follows:
Suppose that ξ ε constitutes an equilibrium of Γ(b, s, r, T) where R obtains EU R (ε) > −16rb 3 /3 − rd. Consider Γ(b, s, r, T ′ ) where T ′ > T. Now, construct a strategy profile ξ ′ ε by modifying ξ ε . In particular, under ξ ′ ε , players follow ξ ε until period T, and then S conveys no information and R never pays money to S in the future. It is obvious that ξ ′ ε constitutes an equilibrium of Γ(b, s, r, T ′ ) and R's equilibrium payoff is equal to
one-shot information transmission where θ is drawn from a distribution with density {g(θ)/G(â 1 )} · 1 [0,â 1 ) (θ). Therefore, the boundaries of this partition, {[â i+1 ,â i )}ñ i=1 , must be solutions to the following non-linear difference equation whose initial and terminal conditions are a 1 =â 1 and añ +1 = 0: for i = 2, . . . ,ñ,
Whenâ 1 = 1, the solution to (31) induces a partition that coincides withñ-element equilibrium partition in the one-shot cheap talk game. 36 Moreover, the solution to (31) varies continuously with respect to initial condition a 1 =â 1 . Recall that a solution to (1)- (3) in Section 3.1 induces a partition: 0 =ãñ < · · · <ã 1 <ã 0 = 1. Therefore, there exists x ∈ (ã 1 , 1) such that (31) is well defined for allâ 1 ∈ (x, 1). Let a 1 be the minimum value of x such that for allâ 1 ∈ (x, 1), the solution to (31) induces anñ-element partition: 0 =âñ +1 <âñ < · · · 
+ w * for θ ≥â 1 , and (33)
When (33) and (34) hold, S has no incentive to deviate fromσ at stage 1 in period 1. Since I assume that R's payment must be non-negative, w * must be non-negative. If w * (â 1 ) = 0 for someâ 1 ∈ (a 1 , 1), then (1)-(3) has a solution: 0 =âñ +1 <âñ < · · · <â 0 = 1. This is incompatible with the definition ofñ. Hence, R's payment,
, which holds for equation (32), is positive for anyâ 1 ∈ (a 1 , 1). Since
At any h (t,2) , R has no incentive to increase the amount of payment because that does not affect S's behavior. Therefore, I have only to ensure the optimality of ρ at h (1, 2) such that m 1 <â 1 . At this history, if R pays w 1 < w * , then she obtains u(w 1 ):
On the other hand, by paying w 1 ≥ w * at history h (1, 2) such that m 1 < a 1 , she obtains u * (w 1 ):
Therefore, paying w * is an optimal decision for R at h (1, 2) such that m 1 <â 1 if and 
. In the following part, s · α(â 1 ) denotes R's payment, w * (â 1 ), which holds for equation (32). Inequality (35) can be simplified into s/r ≤ V(â 1 )/α(â 1 ). It is obvious that V(â 1 )/α(â 1 ) is continuous inâ 1 ∈ (a 1 , 1], and
This outcome implies that if s/r < η(b), there exists a non-empty set {â 1 ∈ (a 1 , 1) : s/r ≤ V(â 1 )/α(â 1 )} such that ((σ,ρ),f ) constitutes an (ñ + 1)-element partition equilibrium whenâ 1 ∈ {â 1 ∈ (a 1 , 1) : s/r ≤ V(â 1 )/α(â 1 )}. (a 1 , 1] , there exists z ∈ (a 1 , 1) such that s/r ≤ V(â 1 )/α(â 1 ) holds for anyâ 1 ∈ (z, 1). Let a 1 (s/r) be the infimum value of z. Then, the value of a 1 (s/r) is strictly decreasing and goes to a 1 as s/r goes to 0.
Appendix 5.B Proof of Proposition 14
First, I show the following Lemma 6. 
Pproof of Proposition 14
Suppose that s ′′ /r ′′ < s ′ /r ′ < η(b). In the proof of Lemma 7, I show that {x ∈ (a 1 (s ′ /r ′ ), 1) : δ(x, s ′ , r ′ ) > 0} ∅ and {x ∈ (a 1 (s ′′ /r ′′ ), Therefore, I obtain dŴ dx x=1 =ñ
Sinceã j =ñ I have already shown that s ·α(x, b) > 0 for x ∈ (ã 1 , 1). Hence, these results conclude that there existsη(b) such that for κ ∈ {R, S}, EŨ κ (x) > EU κ CS holds for some x ∈ (ã 1 , 1).
